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Abstract—The growing demand in mobile Internet access
calls for high capacity and energy efficient cellular access with
better cell coverage. The in-band relaying solution, proposed in
LTE-Advanced, improves coverage without requiring additional
spectrum for backhauling, making its deployment more eco-
nomical and practical. However, in-band relay without careful
management incurs low spectrum utilization and reduces the
system capacity. We propose auction-based solutions that aim at
dynamic spectrum resource sharing, maximizing the utilization of
precious spectrum resources. We first present a truthful auction
that ensures a theoretical performance guarantee in terms of
social welfare. Then in an extended system model that focuses
on addressing the heterogeneity of resource blocks, we design a
more practical auction mechanism. We implement our proposed
auctions under large scale real-world settings. Simulation results
verify the efficacy of proposed auctions, showing improvements
in both cell coverage and spectrum efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bandwidth-intensive mobile applications, such as video
streaming, cloud-based services and social media apps, have
gained momentum in cellular networks. Consequently there
is an escalating demand for cellular data service with higher
efficiency, larger capacity and better cell coverage. Cellular
operators keep upgrading their networks and deploying new
equipments to cater for such a growing demand. For example,
Rogers, a major cellular service provider in Canada, recently
launched their LTE-Advanced (LTE-A) service in 12 major
Canadian markets [1].
As high as the traction to expand the LTE market, there is
a trend to deploy more base stations for denser coverage in
a geographical area. It is intended to improve signal quality
in general, but comes with the cost of increased radio inter-
ference between neighbouring cells. The problem exacerbates
when many users locate at the edge, rather than around the
center, of a macrocell site [2]. Furthermore, high frequencies
employed by LTE leads to quick signal strength degradation
during propagation. The situation further deteriorates with the
introduction of mmWave spectrum, which is planned for the
upcoming 5G communication [3]. Radio signals are more
easily attenuated by hills, buildings, foliage and even heavy
rain, making cellular communication less reliable in certain
outdoor and indoor scenarios [4], [5].
The problem could be alleviated by a heterogeneous net-
work infrastructure (HetNet). The HetNet is a wireless network
exploiting multiple types of access nodes, including macro-
cells, picocells and femtocells, to to improve coverage in a
given area and to offer users better experience. A macrocell has
the widest coverage, and serves as the main pole connecting
to distant areas. Femtocells cover a much smaller range,
and are typically deployed to enhance signals in compact
space. Different access nodes can be deployed in a flexible
combination to fit the needs of varying application scenarios
such as office buildings, homes, shopping malls and subway
stations [2], [6].
The HetNet solution is adopted in the LTE-A standard,
where Relay Nodes (RNs) are introduced to provide small
cell coverage at cell edges [1], [7]. Different from current
picocells and femtocells that use fibre-based backhauls, RNs
in LTE-A are connected to the macrocell via a radio interface.
It is possible to deploy RNs everywhere without installing
fibre or broadband infrastructure in advance. RNs hence have
the potential of flexibly and substantially improve LTE-A cell
coverage. Due to the use of in-band wireless connection as the
backhaul, RNs may cause interference with the macrocell. The
situation may become worse when a large number of RNs and
user equipments (UEs) are served directly by the same donor
eNodeB within the macrocell.
A possible solution to the interference problem caused by
RNs is time-sharing using a pre-determined, static inter-cell
interference coordination scheme [8]. However, such static
sharing is not flexible and may lead to resource under-
utilization under time-varying workload in the RNs’ small
cells. Furthermore, RNs can be installed by the users them-
selves, instead of mobile network operators, to improve cov-
erage at user locations such as offices, homes, farms, and
stores in large shopping malls. A coordination based solution
may be vulnerable because users have no incentive to provide
truthful information to the centralized controller, when falsified
information may help selfish users to obtain extra benefits.
Compared with static spectrum sharing, auction based dy-
namic sharing can promptly adapt to network dynamics. The
auction approach is further efficient in allocating resources to
where they are most valued. Truthfulness is a key property
pursued in auction mechanism design, precluding deceitful
bids from strategical bidders driven by their own interests. The
celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction is known
to guarantee both truthfulness and economic efficiency in
terms of social welfare maximization. However, VCG auctions
require solving the underlying winner determination problem
(WDP) multiple times. The underlying WDP is proven NP-
hard in many real world auction scenarios, including the one
in this work. Hence the VCG auction is impractical to apply di-
rectly, given its computational complexity. In the performance
evaluation section, we show that solving the WDP optimally
in a HetNet is impossible within in tolerable time, even using
a state-of-the-art integer program solver cplex [9].
As a result, we resort to efficient approximation algorithms
that run in polynomial time to conduct spectrum allocation in
an LTE-A HetNet. Along with a judiciously designed payment
rule, the approximation allocation algorithm can be converted
to a truthful auction. We focus on two HetNet models in this
work, including a relaying base station model and an extended
HetNet model. For the former, resource blocks are considered
as homogeneous. The latter model considers heterogeneous
resource blocks, in which UEs and RNs experience varying
channel quality over different channels. Two approximation
algorithms are designed using the primal-dual framework.
Then two auctions, aiming at soliciting truthful bids from
selfish users, are proposed for the two HetNet models respec-
tively. We prove that both auctions are truthful and individual
rational, and both run in polynomial time. Using a primal-
dual analysis based on linear programming duality, we also
prove an approximation ratio that guarantees the outcome
would be nearly optimal for the relaying base station model.
In particular, in practical scenarios where the total amount of
allocated resource is far larger than the amount of resource
requested by a single user in a single time slot, the theoretical
ratio approaches 1/e, where e is the base of natural logarithm.
Extensive simulation studies are conducted to evaluate the
proposed auction mechanisms at large system scales. Simu-
lation results exhibit close-to-optimum performance in terms
of social welfare for both mechanisms, much better than
suggested by the theoretical worst-case bound 1/e. The total
throughput and individual throughput are further compared,
showing that the proposed mechanisms achieve relatively high
system throughput. For the extended HetNet model, we also
compare the proposed auction with alternative schedulers from
the literature, revealing that our auction could produce higher
social welfare and relatively fair resource sharing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss
background and related work in Sec. II. The system model is
introduced in Sec. III, with their truthful auctions designed and
analyzed in Sec. IV and Sec. V. Sec. VI contains performance
evaluation, and Sec. VII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND & RELATED WORK
A. Background of LTE and LTE-Advanced Networks
An LTE system has two major components: the Evolved
Packet Core (EPC) and the evolved NodeBs (eNodeB) or
basestations [1], [7], [10]. The EPC is composed of a range
of entities, among which the Mobility Management Entity
(MME) provides key control functions in the control plane,
and the Home Subscriber Server (HSS) stores user information
in its database. The Serving Gateway (SGW) is connected
to the eNodeBs, and serves as the end point of E-UTRAN
in the data plane. The Packet Gateway (PGW) provides
connectivity to external packet data network. LTE-Advanced
(LTE-A) [11], [10], emerging as a major extension of LTE
recently as a complete fulfilment of 4G, provides up to 3 Gbps
download link access and up to 1.5 Gbps upload link access
by incorporating i) carrier aggregation, ii) MIMO techniques,
and iii) in-band relay. In particular, the relay nodes improve the
cell coverage by connecting to an eNodeB via radio interface.
Resource Allocation. The minimum allocation unit of radio
resource in LTE and LTE-A is a Resource Block (RB), whose
size is 180 kHz in frequency domain and 0.5 ms in time
domain [10]. In practice, RBs are often allocated in a group.
The group size varies depending on the configuration of
bandwidth. For example, for system bandwidth between 11
and 26 MHz, a group of two RBs form an atomic resource
allocation unit.
CQI Reporting. In LTE and LTE-A, Channel Quality Indica-
tor (CQI) reporting plays a critical role in spectrum allocation
and transmission scheduling. the CQI value ranges from 0
to 15 [10]. Each value indicates a supportable modulation
(QPSK, 16QAM, 64QAM) and coding rate. High CQI values
imply high channel quality and high data rates.
B. Related work
A series of recent studies focus on wireless relay net-
works. Oyman [12] analyzes the spectrum efficiency of oppor-
tunistic scheduling and spectrum reuse algorithms in orthog-
onal frequency-division multiple-access (OFDMA) cellular
networks with relay stations. Our work instead studies the
spectrum resource allocation using an auction approach. Ren
et al. [13] study relay transmission in the downlink of a
multi-channel time-division-multiple-access (TDMA) cellular
network, presenting distributed algorithms to compute power
allocation for self-interested relay nodes. Huang et al. [14]
propose mechanisms to determine relay selection as well
as relay power allocation in a cooperative communication
network. Both works focused on the existence of Nash Equi-
librium of proposed mechanisms, while our work focuses on
the dominant-strategy solutions with individual rationality and
good approximation ratio in social welfare.
Wireless spectrum is a scarce resource; efficient utilization
of spectrum resources is key to the optimization of a wireless
communication network. Spectrum auctions represent an effi-
cient solution approach, which have been extensively studied
in wireless networks. Jia et al. [15] propose two spectrum
auctions: an optimal VCG-type auction and a suboptimal truth-
ful auction. However the former is computationally infeasible
while the latter does not provide performance guarantee in
terms of approximation ratio. Zhu et al. [16] design a truthful
auction for secondary spectrum markets. Nevertheless their
design exploits a packing structure in the underlying problem
while our problem is essentially a non-packing problem.
Auctions are also widely used in cloud computing to dynam-
ically provision computing resources to users. For example,
Zhang et al. [17] proposed a randomized auction for cloud
computing using a primal-dual decomposition technique. Shi
et al. [18] further extend the randomized auction to an online
scenario where user requests arrive on the fly. Yet again both
solutions require the underlying WDP to be of packing type.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an LTE-A HetNet where the wireless network
employs heterogeneous types of access nodes. The system runs
in a time slotted fashion. In each time slot, the HetNet system,
whose controller is behind the donor eNodeB and located in
the EPC, allocates available resource blocks (RBs) to the RNs
as well as the UEs, while avoiding interference within the
cell. Towards efficient RB allocation, the system adopts an
auction-based allocation approach. Suppose that the downlink
in a single donor cell consists of a donor eNodeB and a set
R of RNs with cardinality R. Let A be the spectrum band
the eNodeB is using. The total number of RBs within a single
time slot is N .
At each time slot, the controller in the EPC acts as the
auctioneer, soliciting bids from bidders that include RNs as
well as UEs, as shown in Figure 1.
EPCRN
eNodeB
RN
RN
Internet
Step1: EPC solicits 
bids from users
Step2: Users submit 
bids to EPC
Step3: EPC notifies 
auction results and 
payments 
Fig. 1. Downlink resource block allocation in a HetNet.
A. The Relaying Base Station Model
Our first model, the relaying BS Model, focuses on allocat-
ing homogeneous RBs among RNs as well as UEs based on
their submitted bids, while ensuring that a sufficient number
of RBs is reserved for the intra-RN communication so that all
participants in the system can communicate simultaneously.
Assume that RNs’ areas of coverage do not overlap. Let
B = Br ∪ Bu denote the set of bidders, where Br is the set
of RNs and Bu is the set of UEs served directly by the donor
eNodeB. Let bi = (ri, vi) be the bid submitted by user i, where
ri is the number of RBs it requests, for which it is willing to
pay up to vi. xi is a binary variable indicating whether bid bi
wins. We also have a (|B|+1)×N matrix A = (aik), where
aik is a 0/1 variable indicating whether RB k is allocated to
bidder i (bidder |B|+ 1 denotes the resource reserved for the
transmission within a relay node’s coverage). At the end, each
relay node i ∈ Br receives an auction result indicating which
RB it is allocated for receiving transmission from the donor
eNodeB and which RB it could use to transmit data to the UEs
served by the relay node.
The number of RBs allocated to a winning bidder i
should equal the number requested in its bid, i.e.,
∑
k aik =
rixi, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ |B|.
Each RB can be allocated to at most one bidder in the cell,
in order to avoid interference, i.e.,
∑|B|+1
i=1 ai,k ≤ 1, ∀k.
Another important constraint is that the number of RBs allo-
cated to each relay node for downloading data from the donor
eNodeB should be smaller than that reserved for the inner
communication between RNs and their UEs, i.e., the system
should reserve a sufficient number of RBs for the intra-RN
communication in order to achieve seamlessly transmission
between UEs served by RNs and the donor eNodeB.
∑
k
ai,k ≤
∑
k
a|B|+1,k,∀i ∈ Br.
Let pi and v˜i be the payment and true valuation of bidder
i, respectively. The utility of i is then:
ui =
{ v˜i − pi if bidder i wins.
0 otherwise
The social welfare of the HetNet is defined as the summa-
tion of all utilities, including the seller and the bidders. Under
truthful bidding, social welfare equals
∑
i,j v
j
i x
j
i , since pay-
ments cancel themselves. The winner determination problem
(WDP) is:
maximize
∑
i
vixi (1)
subject to:
∑
k
aik = rixi, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ |B| (1a)
|B|+1∑
i=1
ai,k ≤ 1, ∀k (1b)
∑
k
ai,k ≤
∑
k
a|B|+1,k, ∀i ∈ Br (1c)
aik, xi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, k (1d)
The allocation result includes, for each user i ∈ B: which
RBs can be used to download data from the donor eNodeB,
and which can be used to send data to UEs served by RNs.
Theorem 1: The optimization problem WDP (1) is NP-hard.
Proof: Consider a special case where |Br| = 0, then constraint
(1c) can be removed. Allocating nothing to the |B|+ 1 user,
which is considered as RBs reserved for intra-RN communi-
cation, will not decrease the maximum
∑
i vixi. So we do
not differentiate the RBs. (1a) and (1b) are equivalent to∑
i rixi =
∑
i,k aik ≤ N in this case. WDP (1) is then
reduced to the classic 0-1 knapsack that is NP-hard. ⊓⊔
B. Extended HetNet Model
We further consider the case in which bids submitted by the
users include their CQI information. We consider the higher-
layer-configured case in an aperiodic reporting situation where
users report CQI for a predetermined set of sub-bands. The
size of a sub-band is typically two or more RBs. In practice,
users are concerned with not only how many RBs they receive
but the actual throughput achievable over those RBs, given that
the RBs are heterogeneous to users. Let a bid bi = (ci, ri, vi),
where ci is a vector that contains the CQI values for all
sub-bands, ri is the number of RBs requested, and vi is the
maximum amount the bidder is willing to pay for a unit
amount of data for the next time slot (e.g., 1 MB). Let xi
be the decision variable indicating whether bidder i wins or
not, and A = (aik) be the allocation matrix.
The constraints are similar to those in Sec. III-A. We
next determine the social welfare. Assume bidder i ob-
tains a set of RBs Ri, where |Ri| = ri, and its true
CQI is c∗i . The total social welfare under truthfully bidding
is
∑
i vi
∑
k:aik 6=0
CRc∗
i,p(k)
aik , where p(k) is the subframe
where RB k is located, c∗i,p(k) is the CQI of RB k for user i,
and CRc∗
i,p(k)
is the amount of information bits in RB k for
user i. The WDP of the extended HetNet model is:
maximize:
∑
i
{
vi
∑
k:aik 6=0
CRc∗
i,p(k)
aik
}
(2)
subject to:
∑
k
aik = rixi, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ |B| (2a)
|B|+1∑
i=1
ai,k ≤ 1, ∀k (2b)
∑
k
ai,k ≤
∑
k
a|B|+1,k, ∀i ∈ Br (2c)
aik, xi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, k (2d)
Theorem 2: The optimization problem defined in WDP (2)
is NP-hard.
Proof: Consider the case where all CQI values are equal. Then
the objective of the problem becomes:
∑
i
{
vi
∑
k:aik 6=0
CRc∗
i,p(k)
aik
}
=
∑
i
{
virixiCRc∗
i
}
=
∑
i
v˜′ixi,
where v˜′i = viriCRc∗ . Then the problem reduces to the WDP
(1), which we proved to be NP-hard. ⊓⊔
IV. AUCTION DESIGN FOR THE RELAYING BS MODEL
As the underlying WDP (1) is NP-complete, we consider
its LP relaxation by relaxing the constraint (1d) to ai,k ≥
0, 1 ≥ xi ≥ 0, instead of solving the integer programming
problem directly. Then by introducing dual variables β,λ,ρ
and ξ corresponding to (1a) − (1c) and xi ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ B,
respectively, we formulate the dual of (1) as follows:
minimize
|N|∑
k=1
λk +
|B|∑
i=1
ξi (3)
subject to:
riβi + ξi − vi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ B (3a)
λk ≥ max{
∑
i∈Br
ρi,max
i∈B
(βi − ρi1i∈Br )} ∀k (3b)
βi unconstrained, λk, ρi, ξi ≥ 0 ∀i, k (3c)
where 1i∈Br = 1 if i ∈ Br; 0 otherwise. Constraint (3b) can
be reformulated into the following three inequalities:
λk − βi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ Bu, k
λk − βi + ρi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ Br, k
λk −
∑
i∈Br
ρi ≥ 0, ∀k
Constraint (3b) does not differentiate among RBs, which
can be considered identical. Furthermore, βi can also be
substituted by λ and ρi. The problem becomes:
minimize |N |λ +
|B|∑
i=1
ξi (4)
subject to:
riλ+ ρi1i∈Br + ξi − vi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ B (4a)
λ−
∑
i∈Br
ρi ≥ 0 (4b)
λ, ρi ≥ 0 ∀i (4c)
Let δ = |N |/maxi∈B ri. We design the following approx-
imation algorithm shown in Algorithm 1. The first part of
Algorithm 1 initializes the primal and dual variables. Then we
sort all bids from users in descending order of vi/ri. Next, a
while loop iteratively updates the primal and dual variables.
The key idea behind Algorithm 1 is to find a bidder µ such
that vµ/rµ, which can be interpreted as the value of a unit-
weight RB, is maximized among the remaining unallocated
bidders. It then allocates the corresponding number of RBs
according to the demand of µ.
The exit condition and the update rule for the dual variable
λ are designed carefully to ensure the feasibility of the primal
variables, while dual variables (not necessarily feasible upon
algorithm termination) can be converted to a feasible solution
through the technique of dual fitting. The approximation ratio
of the primal-dual algorithm can be analyzed by comparing the
primal solution and the converted dual solution, establishing
a bound on their ratio, and then applying weak LP duality.
The feasibility of Algorithm 1 is ensured by the following
theorem, which also shows that Algorithm 1 runs in polyno-
mial time. The proof is in Appendix A.
Theorem 3: Algorithm 1 computes a feasible solution to the
primal problem in O(|B| log |B|).
The approximation ratio of Algorithm 1 is revealed in the
following theorem, whose proof is available in Appendix A.
Algorithm 1 A Primal-Dual Allocation Algorithm
1: // Initialization
2: p = 0; t = 0; C = ∅;
3: ∀i ∈ B : xi = 0, ρi = 0, ξi = 0, λ0 = 1/|N |;
4:
5: Sort { vi
ri
|∀i ∈ B};
6: while C 6= B AND |N |λt ≤ exp(δ − 2) do
7: µ = argmaxi∈B\C
{
vi
ri
}
;
8: xµ = 1; ξµ = vµ;
9: p = p+ vµ; C = C ∪ {µ};
10: if µ ∈ Br then
11: ρµ = λ
t
|Br|
12: end if
13: λt+1 = λt · exp(δ − 2)rµ/(|N|−2maxi∈B ri);
14: t = t+ 1;
15: end while
Theorem 4: Algorithm 1 guarantees α-approximation, where
α = δ−2
δe−2 , δ = |N |/maxi∈B ri.
Algorithm 1 achieves at least an α = (δ − 2)/(δe − 2)
fraction of optimal social welfare. Yet it does not eliminate
deceitful bids from strategic users. A carefully designed pay-
ment scheme can help the donor eNodeB rule out falsified bids,
ensuring the truthfulness of the mechanism. Let b = (bi, b−i)
be the bids submitted by the bidders, where bi is the bid of
bidder i and b−i includes the bids of others. Pi(bi, b−i) is
the winning probability when bidder i submits bid bi. The
following theorem characterizes a sufficient and necessary
condition of the truthfulness of an auction.
Theorem 5: [19] An auction with bids b and payments Π
is truthful in expectation if and only if
1) Pi(bi) is monotonically non-decreasing in bi, ∀i ∈ B;
2) The expected payment satisfies:
E[Πi] = biPi(bi, b−i)−
∫ bi
0
Pi(b, b−i)db,∀i ∈ B.
Assume all bids request the same numbers of RBs, and
bidder i wins with bidding price vi. If other bids v−i remain
the same, then bidder i wins as well with bidding price higher
than vi, since the allocation rules in Algorithm 1 is greedy.
If the bidding price is lower than vi, then bidder i might lose
since other bids can be selected before bi. That is, P (vi, v−i),
the probability of user i wins when submitting (ri, vi), is non-
decreasing in vi. For a deterministic mechanism, there are only
two possible values 0 and 1 for Pi(vi). A critical bidding price
v∗i for each winning bidder i is that
Pi(vi)
{
0 if vi < v∗i
1 otherwise
Given v∗i , the corresponding payment is
Πi = viPi(vi, v−i)−
∫ vi
v∗
i
Pi(v, v−i)dv = v
∗
i .
Following the definition, the critical bid can be computed
via a binary search between 0 and vi for any winning bidder
i, such that bidder i wins when vi ≥ v∗i , and loses otherwise.
The detailed payment rule is described in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Payment Rules
1: // Initialization
2: ∀i ∈ B,Πi = 0;
3:
4: for i ∈ B do
5: if bidder i wins, i.e., xi == 1 then
6: a = 0, b = vi;
7: while (b− a) > ǫ do
8: Run Algorithm 1 with ( a+b
2
, v−i) as bids;
9: if bidder i wins then
10: b = a+b
2
;
11: else
12: a = a+b
2
;
13: end if
14: end while
15: Πi = (b+ a)/2;
16: else
17: Πi = 0;
18: end if
19: end for
Theorem 6: The time complexity of the payment rules in
Algorithm 2 is O(|B|2 log(m/ǫ) log |B|).
Proof: The for loop is executed exactly |B| times. Within
the for loop. The while loop is a binary search that has
O(log vi/ǫ) steps. Line 8 costs O(|B| log |B|) time according
to Theorem 3. Therefore the total time complexity is:
O(|B| log(vi/ǫ) · |B| log |B|) ≤ O(|B|
2 log(m/ǫ) log |B|). ⊓⊔
Theorem 7: The allocation rule (Algorithm 1) and the
payment rule (Algorithm 2) together constitute an auction that
is truthful, individual rational, and achieves α-approximation
in social welfare of the HetNet, where α = δ−2
δe−2 .
Proof: As discussed, the winning probability of user i is non-
decreasing in the bidding price vi. We then examine whether
the payment rule satisfies the second condition in Theorem
5. Given a positive real number ǫ, for a winning bidder i,
we always find a payment Πi where |Πi − v∗i | ≤ ǫ, i.e., the
critical bidding price can be found within a given margin of
error. Therefore the second condition is also satisfied, and the
spectrum auction is truthful.
The utility of bidder i under truthfully bidding is then:
ui = v˜i − Πi = vi −Πi.
Due to the payment rules in Algorithm 2, vi ≥ Πi, which
implies that ui ≥ 0, i.e., a bidder’s utility will be non-negative
when it bids truthfully. Thus the auction is individual rational.
Theorem 4 shows the allocation rule in Algorithm 1 is a
δ−2
δe−2 -approximation, so the auction is
δ−2
δe−2 -approximation in
system-wide social welfare as well. ⊓⊔
Note that limδ→∞ δ−2δe−2 =
1
e
, which indicates that the ratio
approaches 1/e ≈ 0.368 as δ increases. In practice, the total
number of available RBs is typically much larger than the
demand from a single user device, i.e., N ≫ m = maxi∈B ri.
Consequently, the ratio is approximately 0.368. The curve of
δ−2
δe−2 is plotted in Figure 2, showing that the ratio quickly
approaches 0.368 as δ increases.
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When CQIreport − CQIactual ≥
1, BLER is close to 1, transmis-
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V. A TRUTHFUL AUCTION FOR EXTENDED HETNET
In LTE-A, the base station chooses coding rate as well
as the modulation scheme according to the CQI reported by
UEs. It may appear that strategic users could report falsified
CQI values in the hope of increasing its chances of winning
channels. However, reporting CQI higher than the actual value
may lead to high transmission failure rates [20], making
effective data transmission almost impossible, as shown in
Figure 3. Meanwhile, reporting lower CQI leads to lower
coding rate and lower throughput even though transmission
success rate becomes higher. Therefore selfish users typically
have no motivation to falsify CQI reports in practice. In
the following design and analysis, we assume that CQIs and
number of desired RBs reported by the users are true.
Let Ri,k = viCRc∗
i,p(k)
, ∀i, k, then the objective of the
extended HetNet model is
∑
i,k Rikaik. We derive the dual of
(2) by introducing dual variables β˜, λ˜, ρ˜ and ξ˜ corresponding
to (2a)− (2c) and xi ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ B, respectively:
minimize
|N|∑
k=1
λ˜k +
|B|∑
i=1
ξ˜i (5)
subject to:
λ˜k ≥ max{
∑
i∈Br
ρ˜i,max
i∈B
(β˜i − ρ˜i1i∈Br +Ri,k)}, ∀k ∈ N (5a)
riβ˜i + ξ˜i ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ B (5c)
λ˜k ≥ 0, ρ˜i ≥ 0, ξ˜i ≥ 0 ∀i, k (5d)
To minimize
∑|N |
k=1 λ˜k +
∑|B|
i=1 ξ˜i, we set β˜i = 0 if ξ˜i = 0;
β˜i = −ξ˜i/ri if ξ˜i > 0. In either case, we can write β˜i =
−ξ˜i/ri. Substitute β˜i in (5a) with β˜i = −ξ˜i/ri, then we have
λ˜k + ξ˜i/ri + ρ˜i1i∈Br ≥ Ri,k, ∀i, k
λ˜k ≥
∑
i∈Br
ρ˜i, ∀k
Given the different problem structure resulting from hetero-
geneous RBs, we design a new greedy primal-dual algorithm
in Algorithm 3 for the extended HetNet model. The extended
HetNet model has the same solution space as the Relaying BS
model does, so we adopt a similar termination condition of the
while loop and dual variable update rule to ensure primal
solution feasibility. In the while loop, a greedy selection
is applied to choose the bid that is most valued in terms of
(unit price × throughput). Then the corresponding primal and
dual variables are updated accordingly. However, Ri,k in (5a)
makes the RBs heterogeneous in the extended HetNet model.
Therefore the analysis in Sec. VI-A1 does not carry over to
the extended HetNet model in a straightforward way.
Algorithm 3 Allocation Rules for the extended HetNet model
1: // Initialization
2: p = 0; t = 0; C1 = ∅; C2 = ∅;
3: ∀i ∈ B : xi = 0, ρ˜i = 0, ξ˜i = 0, λ˜0k = 1/|N |;
4:
5: while C 6= B AND ∑k λ˜tk ≤ exp(δ − 2) do
6: (µ,D) = argmaxi∈B\C1,D⊆N\C2:|D|=ri
{∑
k∈DRi,k
}
;
7: xµ = 1; aµ,k = 1, ∀k ∈ D;
8: ξ˜µ =
∑
k∈D Rµ,k; p = p+
∑
k∈D Rµ,k;
9: C1 = C1 ∪ {µ}; C2 = C2 ∪ {D}
10: if µ ∈ Br then
11: ρ˜µ = λ
t
|Br|
12: end if
13: λ˜t+1k = λ˜
t
k · exp(δ − 2)
rµ/(|N|−2maxi∈B ri);
14: t = t+ 1;
15: end while
Lemma 1: Given a set E = {e1, ..., ek} and an inte-
ger r ≤ |E|, finding a subset E ⊆ E such that E =
argmax{
∑
i∈E ei| |E| = r} can be done in O(|E|r) time.
Proof: Define the following f(k′, r′):
f(k′, r′) = max
E′⊆{e1,...,ek′}:|E
′|=r′
∑
i∈E′
ei.
We then have a recursive formula as follows:
f(k′, r′) =


max
{
f(k′ − 1, r′ − 1) + ek′ , if k′ > r′ > 1
f(k′ − 1, r′)
}
∑k′
i=1 ei if k
′ = r′
0 if r′ = 0
(6)
Following Eqn. 6, we can design a dynamic programming
algorithm to solve the problem. The total number of states in
the dynamic programming table is E × r, while computing
each state takes two operations. The overall time complexity
is O(E × r). ⊓⊔
Theorem 8: Algorithm 3 computes a feasible solution to the
primal problem (2) in O(m|N ||B|2) time.
Proof: The proof of the feasibility is similar to that of
Theorem 3. The while loop iterates at most |B| times.
In line 6, for each bidder i ∈ B \ C1, we need find
argmaxD⊆N\C2:|D|=ri
{∑
k∈D Ri,k
}
, which costs at most
|N |ri ≤ |N |m according to Lemma 1. The total time com-
plexity is: O(|B| × |B| × |N |2| = O(m|N ||B|2). ⊓⊔
The next lemma shows the winning probability of a bidder
increases as the bidding price vi increases in the extended
HetNet model.
Lemma 2: Algorithm 3 ensures the winning probability is
monotonically non-decreasing in the bidding price.
Proof: The allocation rule in Algorithm 3 is deterministic, and
the winning probability is either 0 or 1. If bidder i wins with
unit bidding price vi, then it wins with any unit price v′i > vi
as well because a higher vi ensures bidder i is still selected
in line 7. Similarly, if bidder i loses with vi, then it also loses
with any v′i < vi. Thus there exists a value v∗i such that bidder
i wins with vi ≥ v∗i and loses with vi < v∗i , implying that the
winning probability is non-decreasing in the bidding price.
⊓⊔
Following Theorem 5, we set the winning bidder i’s
payment to its critical bidding price v∗i , which can be
obtained via binary search shown in Algorithm 2, with
the following time complexity: O(|B| log(m/ǫ)m|N ||B|2) =
O(|B|3m log(m/ǫ)|N |).
Theorem 9: The auction with the allocation rules in Al-
gorithm 3 and payment rule shown above is truthful and
individual rational.
Proof: Lemma 2 and the critical bid based payments guarantee
the truthfulness of the auction in the extended HetNet model.
Under truthfully bidding, the utility of a winning bidder is
non-negative since the critical bidding price is always lower
than the bidding price, which equals the true value. The utility
of a losing bidder is zero since it receives nothing and pays
zero. Thus the auction is individual rational. ⊓⊔
VI. EVALUATION
A. Simulation Studies
To verify the performance of the proposed mechanisms, we
conduct a large-scale simulation studies. An LTE simulator
[21] is employed to generate the SINR as well as corre-
sponding CQIs according to the TS25.814 pathloss model.
The generated traces are used to drive large-scale simulation
studies to verify the auction performance. The system runs in
900 MHz with a bandwidth of 20 MHz. There are 47 UEs
and 5 RNs in one donor eNodeB’s coverage. 40 out of 47
UEs are served by the donor eNodeB directly. The other 7
UEs are located in the coverage of RNs and served by the
RNs instead. The positions of the eNodeB, UEs and RNs are
illustrated in Figure 4. All UEs are walking with a speed of
5 km/h in given directions. The donor eNodeB has a transmit
power of 49 dBm. The entire simulation spans 10 s where
each time slot lasts 10 ms, i.e., 1000 time slots are simulated.
Each user’s resource block demand is uniformly distributed
among [10, 40] since the demand pattern can be considered as
uniformly random when the duration is rather short, e.g., 10 s.
The bidding price is generated according to standard pricing
with a major LTE Advanced carrier in North America, e.g.,
$15 for 300 MB, with randomness. The simulation setting is
summarized in Tab. I. Figure 5 illustrates a generated trace,
i.e., UE5’s CQIs over time and frequency.
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TABLE I
EVALUATION SETTINGS
# of DeNBs 1 Frequency 900 MHz
# of RNs 5 Bandwidth 20 MHz
# of UEs served eNodeB TX power 49 dBm
by DeNB 40 UEs’ speed 5 km/h
# of UEs served UEs’ position Figure 4
by each RN 1 or 2 Auction frequency every 10 ms
1) The Relaying Base Station Model: Social Welfare.
Algorithm 1 is run for the given simulation setting. We first
compare the social welfare obtained by Algorithm 1 with
the optimal one as well as the lower bound of the social
welfare computed according to Theorem 7, as shown in
Figure 6, for the first 1000 ms. We employ cplex as the
integer programming solver to solve the problem optimally.
We observe that the social welfare of Algorithm 1 is rather
close to the optimum, and is substantially better than the
proven theoretical bound. The ratio in Theorem 7 is for the
worst case, and can be rather loose in many cases in practices.
The same conclusion is true for the entire simulation duration,
as illustrated in Figure 7.
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Fig. 6. Social welfare in Algorithm 1
compared with the Optimum for the
first 1000 ms.
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Fig. 7. Social welfare Comparison:
Algorithm 1 and the Optimum, for
t = 1 ∼ 10s.
Runtime & Throughput. The optimum can be computed but
at costs of considerable time and computing resources. We
compare the runtime of Algorithm 1 along with its corre-
sponding payment calculation rules with those of the optimal
allocation. Figure 8 depicts the runtime with a logarithmic
scale on time axis. We observe that the optimal algorithm is
rather costly, approximately 30 s per turn. It is computationally
infeasible to execute in practice. In comparison, the auction
with Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 takes much shorter time
at around 0.2 ms per turn. The performance can be further
improved by optimizing the program structure and code.
Figure 9 illustrates the throughput of the donor eNodeB over
time. We note that the optimal algorithm usually achieves
higher throughput than Algorithm 1 does. However, Algorithm
1 works better at t = 80ms, 110ms, 130ms. Because the
optimal algorithm focuses on maximizing the social welfare
rather than the throughput, and other algorithms could achieve
higher throughput than it.
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Fig. 8. Runtime comparison between
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first 500 ms.
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Fig. 9. Throughput comparison: Al-
gorithm 1 and the Optimum, for t =
1 ∼ 200ms.
We also compare the throughput among UEs and RNs as
shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11. We observe that UEs
in Figure 10 receive sufficient downlink resource to achieve
acceptable throughput. RNs also experience fair throughput,
which implies that the UEs served by RNs also enjoy good
throughput and the coverage is improved.
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Fig. 10. UEs’ throughput comparison
for t = 1 ∼ 200ms.
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Fig. 11. RNs’ throughput compari-
son for t = 1 ∼ 200ms.
RNs’ Received Resources. We next investigate resources
allocated to the RNs. We collect the simulation trace for
the first 200 ms, illustrate the resource block allocation in
Figure 12. In order to avoid interference with donor eNodeB,
RNs are allocated extra resource blocks which are used for
inner communication, as shown in Figure 13. The number of
allocated resource blocks is more than all numbers of resource
blocks received by RNs, therefore the inner communication
can be guaranteed interference-free.
2) Extended HetNet Model: We employ the same UEs
and CQI traces to drive the simulation for the extended
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Fig. 12. The # of RBs received by
RNs for t = 1 ∼ 200ms.
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Fig. 13. The # of RBs reserved for
RNs inner communication.
HetNet model. The bids then are regenerated according to
the requirement of the extended HetNet model and therefore
different from those in Sec. VI-A1.
Social Welfare. The proposed allocation algorithm achieves
close-to-optimum performance in terms of social welfare for
the given problem instance, as illustrated in Figure 14. The
observed gap between Algorithm 3 and the optimum is less
than 6%. We also compute the ratios for first ten time slots as
shown in Table II, and the average ratio is 0.95.
TABLE II
APPROXIMATION RATIO OF ALGORITHM 3
t: 1 ∼ 5 0.948 0.954 0.950 0.946 0.954
t: 6 ∼ 10 0.952 0.949 0.946 0.942 0.956
5 10 15 200.018
0.02
0.022
0.024
0.026
Time (10 ms)
So
cia
l W
el
fa
re
 ($
)
 
 
Optimum
Algorithm 3   .
Fig. 14. Social welfare comparison:
Algorithm 3 and the Optimum, for
t = 1 ∼ 200ms.
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Fig. 15. Throughput comparison:
Algorithm 3 and the Optimum, for
t = 1 ∼ 200ms.
Throughput. We next investigate the performance of Al-
gorithm 3 in terms of throughput. Figure 15 illustrates the
throughput curves of Algorithm 3 and the optimum over
t = 1 ∼ 200ms. Different from the throughput comparison in
Sec. VI-A1, the optimum always achieves higher throughput
than Algorithm 3 does. Furthermore, the extended HetNet
model achieves higher total throughput than the relaying base
station model, e.g., the average throughput of Algorithm 1
in Figure 9 is 22.9 Mbps while the average throughput of
Algorithm 3 is 42.9 Mbps. This is because the extended
HetNet model takes CQI into account for opportunistic assign-
ment. A UE with higher CQI has a higher chance to receive
resources, i.e., experiencing high throughput. Compared with
the relaying base station model, each individual UE also has
higher throughput, as shown in Figure 16. Similar conclusion
holds for RNs as well, as illustrated in Figure 17.
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Fig. 16. UEs’ throughput comparison
for t = 1 ∼ 200ms.
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Fig. 17. RN’s throughput comparison
for t = 1 ∼ 200ms.
Resource Allocation Results. We next study the allocation
result. We compare two results from the relaying base station
model and the extended HetNet model, respectively, as shown
in Figure VI-A2. Each UE or RN is represented by a color. We
notice that the relaying base station model intends to allocate
consecutive resource blocks to a user while the extended
HetNet model would select the resource blocks that can
transmit more bits.
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Fig. 18. RB allocation results in 1st turn.
Comparison with Other Schedulers. Our proposed mech-
anism is compared with two existing schedulers, the Round
Robin scheduler and the Best CQI scheduler [22], in terms of
social welfare and throughput. The Best CQI scheduler assigns
resource blocks to the user who has best CQI value, i.e., best
radio link condition. While Round Robin allocates resource
blocks to users in turn, i.e., all users receive equal size of
resource blocks over time.
Figure 19 depicts the social welfare of each scheduler. We
observe that Algorithm 3 produces the highest social welfare
for each time slot among these three schedulers. Round Robin
is the second highest while Best CQI has the lowest social
welfare. This is because both Round Robin and Best CQI
allocate resources to users no matter whether they need the
resources or not. Our proposed auction algorithm, on the
contrary, finds how users value the resources and how many
resource blocks they need from the bidding information.
Figure 20 shows the total throughput of each scheduler.
We see that the Best CQI scheduler achieves the highest
throughput, our proposed algorithm has median throughput
and Round Robin experiences the lowest throughput. The rea-
son is that: the Best CQI scheduler focuses on finding the user
with the best CQI, therefore it could achieve the maximum
throughput. But it fails to consider users’ needs, e.g., users
with low priority traffic still receive high transmission rates.
Our Algorithm 3 tries to allocate resources to where they are
valued most. It achieves the highest weighted throughput but
not the highest unweighted throughput.
Figure 21 and Figure 22 further show that the high through-
put of the Best CQI scheduler come at the expense of fairness.
For example, UE1 has almost no throughput while UE17 has
a rather high throughput for the first 200 ms under the Best
CQI scheduler. Most users experience low throughput under
the best CQI scheduler. Our algorithm instead can distribute
resource blocks relatively fairly. When a user needs high
throughput to transmit its data, it could bid a higher price.
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Fig. 19. Social welfare comparison
for t = 1 ∼ 200ms.
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Fig. 20. Total throughput comparison
for t = 1 ∼ 200ms.
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Fig. 21. UE1’s throughput compari-
son for t = 1 ∼ 200ms.
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Fig. 22. UE17’s throughput compar-
ison for t = 1 ∼ 200ms.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper discusses inband relaying solution for improv-
ing coverage without requiring extra spectrum resources for
backhauling. We propose auction-based solutions, targeting
at dynamic spectrum resources sharing and allocating the
resources to serve users who value them most. Two truthful
auctions are proposed for the relaying base station model and
the extended HetNet model, repsectively. The first auction
ensures an approximation ratio of δ−2
δe−2 in terms of social wel-
fare. The second auction focuses on tackling the heterogeneity
of resource blocks. Extensive simulations are conducted for
a larger scale scenario to verify the efficacy of proposed
auctions, showing that auctions can improve both coverage
and spectrum efficiency.
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APPENDIX
Proof: First we examine the runtime of Algorithm 1. The
sorting operation can be performed in O(|B| log(|B|)) us-
ing, e.g., Merge-Sort. In each iteration, Algorithm 1 picks
a bid from B. Therefore the while-loop will run at most
|B| times, which is polynomial to the input size. The loop
body runs in constant time (line 7 also costs constant time
since we can pick the first element and remove it when all
bids are sorted in descending order at the very beginning).
Therefore the upper bound of the runtime of Algorithm 1 is
O(|B|+ |B| log(|B|)) = O(|B| log(|B|)).
Since all resource blocks are considered identical, the primal
constraints are transformed to the following:
|B|∑
i=1
rixi +max
j∈Br
rjxj ≤ |N |. (7)
Let µ be the first bid violating the feasibility among the
bids added to the solution set. Let C be the solution set before
µ is added. We have
∑
i∈C∪{µ} ri +maxj∈Br∩(C∪{µ}) rj > |N |
⇔
∑
i∈C ri + rµ +maxj∈Br∩(C∪{µ}) rj > |N |
⇒
∑
i∈C ri > |N | − 2maxj∈B rj
⇒
∑
i∈C ri/(|N | − 2maxj∈B rj) > 1.
which further implies that:
|N |λ =
1
|N |
|N | exp(δ − 2)
∑
i∈C
ri
|N|−2maxj∈B rj > exp(δ − 2).
which violates the termination condition, so µ will not be
added to the solution set. Thus Algorithm 1 provides a feasible
solution to the primal problem. ⊓⊔
Proof: Let d∗ be the value of the optimal dual objective.
Let m = maxi∈B ri. Suppose (vµ, rµ) is the bid selected in
iteration t − 1. We also assume that the last iteration is ω.
According to the update rule of λ, we have:
|N |λt = |N |λt−1 · exp(δ − 2)rµ/(|N|−2m)
= |N |λt−1(1 + (exp(δ − 2)m/(|N|−2m) − 1))rµ/m
≤ |N |λt−1(1 +
rµ
m
(exp(δ − 2)m/(|N|−2m) − 1))
= |N |λt−1 + λt−1
rµ|N |
m
(exp(δ − 2)m/(|N|−2m) − 1),
where the last inequality is due to (1+ a)x ≤ (1+ ax), ∀x ∈
[0, 1]. Note that δ = |N |/maxi∈B ri = |N |/m, we have:
|N |λt ≤ |N |λt−1 + λt−1rµδ(exp(δ − 2)
1/(δ−2) − 1)
= |N |λt−1 + λt−1rµδ(e− 1)
= |N |λt−1 + vµδ(e− 1)/g(λ
t−1).
(8)
where g(λt−1) = vµ
λt−1rµ
.
Next the approximation ratio is analyzed as follows. It is
trivial if Algorithm 1 terminates due the condition C == B.
Because all bids are accepted in that case, and the result is
optimal.
As a result, we assume that Algorithm 1 terminates due to
the condition |N |λω > exp(δ − 2). A lower bound on the
solution obtained from Algorithm 1 will be found.
We first show that a dual solution (λt−1,ρt−1, ξt−1) ob-
tained from Algorithm 1 can be converted into a feasible dual
solution
(
g(λt−1)λt−1, g(λt−1)ρt−1, ξt−1
)
by the following
three cases.
Case 1, ∀i ∈ C ⊆ B, we know that
(riλ
t−1 + ρt−1i 1i∈Br )g(λ
t−1) + ξt−1i − vi ≥ 0,
holds for any λt−1 > 0, ρt−1i ≥ 0 since ξ
t−1
i = vi.
Case 2, ∀i ∈ B \C, (riλt−1 + ρt−1i 1i∈Br )g(λt−1)+ ξ
t−1
i −
vi = ri
vµ
rµ
+ρt−1i 1i∈Br
vµ
λt−1rµ
+ξt−1i −vi. According to line 7
in Algorithm 1, we know that vµ
rµ
≥ vi
ri
, ∀i ∈ B \ C, therefore
we have that: ri vµrµ ≥ vi. Therefore we know that (4a) holds
for the converted dual solution.
Case 3, Next we examine constraint (4b).
λt−1g(λt−1)−
∑
i∈Br
ρig(λ
t−1) =(λt−1 −
∑
i∈Br
ρi)g(λ
t−1)
≥(λt−1 − |Br |
λt−1
|Br|
)g(λt−1) ≥ 0,
where the first inequality holds due to λt increases as t in-
creases. Thus (λt−1g(λt−1), g(λt−1)ρt−1, ξt−1) is a feasible
solution to the dual problem in (4). According to the weak
duality, we have
d∗ ≤ |N |λt−1g(λt−1) +
∑
i∈B
ξt−1i ⇐⇒
d∗ −
∑
i∈B ξ
t−1
i
|N |λt−1
≤ g(λt−1).
Note that if ∃t ≤ ω,
∑
i∈B ξ
t
i/d
∗ ≥ α, then we have p ≥∑
i∈B ξ
t
i ≥ αd
∗
, which implies that the approximation ratio is
α = δ−2
δe−2 . Now suppose ∀t ≤ ω,
∑
i∈B ξ
t
i/d
∗ < α, then
(1− α)
d∗
|N |λt−1
≤
d∗ −
∑
i∈B ξ
t−1
i
|N |λt−1
≤ g(λt−1). (9)
Combining (8) and (9), we have:
|N |λt ≤ |N |λt−1 +
vµδ(e− 1)|N |λ
t−1
(1− α)d∗
= |N |λt−1(1 +
vµδ(e− 1)
(1− α)d∗
)
≤ |N |λt−1 exp(
vµδ(e− 1)
(1− α)d∗
).
Apply the above inequality for t = 0, ..., ω:
|N |λω ≤ |N |
1
|N |
exp(
pδ(e− 1)
(1− α)d∗
).
Next recall that Algorithm 1 terminates due to the condi-
tion |N |λω > exp(δ − 2), then we have exp(δ − 2) <
exp( pδ(e−1)(1−α)d∗ ), which implies α =
(δ−2)(1−α)
δ(e−1) ⇐⇒ α =
δ−2
δe−2 .
⊓⊔
